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Abstract

C

hinese investment activity in Africa has skyrocketed in recent years, outpacing
every other nation except South Africa. China finances more infrastructure
projects in Africa than the World Bank and provides billions of dollars in lowinterest loans to the continent’s emerging economies. These loans and investments
are typically made in exchange for securing access to natural resources. Based on
its principles of nonintervention and respect for sovereignty, China gives this money
with little or no strings attached. The West, which typically conditions its loans on
initiatives like democracy promotion and corruption reduction, has labeled China a
“rogue donor,” whose actions will be damaging to Africa in the long run. However,
Western aid approaches like conditionality have largely been development failures.
The Chinese model, with no colonial past or explicit political agenda, is a legitimate
challenger to the Western aid status-quo. China is merely the largest and first leader
of a growing cohort of developing countries interested in Africa’s commodities. These
new investors have the option to adopt wholly China’s unconditioned approach or a
more responsible engagement strategy. What all players are beginning to realize is
that ultimately Africans themselves must decide what form they want this increased
investment attention to take.

Introduction
The differences between Chinese and Western development approaches in Africa
mirror long-held theoretical debates in the human rights community. The usefulness
or ethics of conditionality, poverty and rights in tension, the trade-off between respect
for sovereignty and principles of human rights—these are all topics that China’s
aid and investment in Africa bring to the surface in the development debate. China
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provides large cheap loans and grants to African governments in exchange for securing
access to natural resources. Based on its principles of nonintervention and respect for
sovereignty, China gives this money with few or no strings attached. The West, which
typically conditions its loans on initiatives like democracy promotion and corruption
reduction, has labeled China a “rogue donor,” whose actions will be damaging to Africa
in the long run. However, Western aid approaches like conditionality have largely been
development failures. China’s activity must also be viewed as the frontrunner in a much
wider search for energy security and natural resources on the part of many emerging
economies across Asia and the world. What all these players are beginning to realize is
that ultimately Africans themselves are in charge of deciding what form they want this
increased investment attention to take. As Chinese roads and factories begin to dot the
continent in increasing numbers, it is a mistake for
China believes
the West to ignore what Africa finds appealing in
this new South-South approach.
that its successful

‘growth at any cost’
strategy at home
can be applied in

Chinese Aid and Investment Policy in
Africa

China’s official policy statement on its trade and
aid relationship with African nations states that as
Africa, and is not
a first principle, China “respects African countries’
shy about it.
choice in political system and development path
suited to their own national conditions, does
not interfere in internal affairs of African countries, and supports them in their just
struggles for safeguarding their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”1
Mutual economic benefit is the main priority of Chinese involvement in Africa, even if
this means ignoring corruption and human rights abuses resulting from the cash flows.
China believes that its successful ‘growth at any cost’ strategy at home can be applied
in Africa, and is not shy about it. “Common sense about human rights and sovereignty
is only one of the common values shared by China and Africa,” says a professor of
African Studies in Beijing, continuing, “There is no doubt that China’s success in Africa
has partly benefited from it, and those common values have laid solid foundations for
further promoting bilateral relations in future.”2
Chinese development programs are centered on infrastructure, production, and
university scholarships, rather than programs and social projects implemented by
foreign aid workers.3 Whereas the United States Agency for International Development
has a close relationship with the Department of State, America’s foreign policy center,
most of China’s aid is doled out by the Ministry of Commerce and the China ExportImport Bank (Exim Bank), whose central mandate is to strengthen China’s economy.4
Its aid approach is closely tied to two national objectives. The first is to secure
commodities such as oil and rare earths for consumption in China. The second is to
support China’s own export-led domestic growth by creating new African markets.
China does not have an official distinction between what is considered foreign
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aid, or what the West calls official development assistance (ODA), and development
initiatives that are more similar to trade and investment agreements.5 The China
Exim Bank provides large subsidized concessional loans to developing countries with
interest rates at significantly below market value.6 The terms of these loans generally
require that at least 50 percent of the money is spent on Chinese goods or services, like
materials and construction firms.7 These loans are often explicitly or implicitly tied to
guarantees to market access of African resources—mainly oil.8 An example of such a
“resource for infrastructure swap” can be found in the Congo. In 2008, the Congolese
government brokered a deal with Beijing for the construction of massive cobalt and
copper mines; 1,800 miles of railways; 2,000 miles of roads; hundreds of clinics,
hospitals, and schools; and two new universities.9 The total value of these investments
reached $6 billion—around half of Congo’s GDP. In exchange, China now has the right
to extract 12 million tons of copper and cobalt over the next 25 years.10
In 2006, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation convened foreign ministers from
48 African states for a summit in Beijing. President Hu Jintao announced that in the
next three years, China would double aid to Africa, provide $6 billion in preferential
loans, establish a $5 billion fund to facilitate Chinese investment, and provide $1.4
billion in debt relief for overdue zero-interest loans.11 Trade between Africa and China
reached more than $120 billion in 2010, at a time when much of the rest of the world’s
economy was still in a slump.12 China provides more subsidized loans to Africa than
the World Bank.13

Investment, Human Rights, and Good Governance
China’s non-interference policy and respect for sovereignty has meant that it pays very
little attention to the negative externalities that arise from its investment spending.
Unlike the West, it does not require recipients of
development funding to implement anti-corruption China’s nonmeasures.14 This should not be a surprising fact,
interference policy
given that corruption is still commonplace within
Chinese businesses themselves. Transparency and respect for
International’s 2008 Bribe Payer’s Index ranked
sovereignty has
Chinese companies 21st out of 22 countries, for
their propensity to bribe overseas.15 In addition, meant that it pays
Chinese infrastructure projects have been found very little attention
to precipitate notorious human rights violations.
In Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia it had to the negative
been found that managers repeatedly ignore externalities
local minimum wage laws and affirmative action
that arise from
requirements, while refusing to pay social security
its investment
and allowances.16
In reaction to criticism, Chinese authorities
have asserted that civil and political rights (CPR)

spending.
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should not be given primacy over economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR).17 In
China’s view, ESCR are achieved through economic development and investment, and
deviations from an economic growth path for the sake of CSR are not justifiable. China
also has often expressed a strong conviction of the non-universality of human rights.18
The “Asian values” argument claims certain cultures value family and community
over individuality, and the Western conception of human rights is inapplicable.19
The domestic Chinese legal system and civil society are also less developed to fight
the practices of the government and corporations. Whereas an oil company based in
the West can be held accountable in a domestic court for being complicit in human
rights abuses, and in America corporations are regularly prosecuted under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, no such mechanisms exist in China.20
China has refused to use its economic or diplomatic power as leverage against
governments that commit even the most extreme human rights abuses or corrupt
practices. It justifies its “clean hands” stance by pointing to its longstanding policy
on noninterference—China thinks its domestic human rights issues are nobody’s
business, so it has no interest in meddling in the internal affairs of others. As the
Chinese ambassador to Eritrea declared: “There are no rogue states. China has been
labeled this in the past and other governments should not criticize.”21 It is useful to take
a closer look at a few cases where Western criticism of China is the strongest.
Angola
Angola is an autocratically ruled state that is notorious for corruption, inefficiency, and
persistent poverty. It was ranked forty-two of forty-eight sub-Saharan African states
on the 2007 Index of African Governance list.22 It also has enormous oil reserves,
producing as much annually as Kuwait.23 Human Rights Watch reported that in a fiveyear period, $4.2 billion worth of oil revenues were siphoned off of Angola’s public
accounts.24 This amounts to around 10 percent of GDP, in a country where most people
live on less than $2 day.25 Because of this, in 2004, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) was attaching transparency measures requirements to the loans it provided
Angola for post-war reconstruction efforts. The ruling elite was reluctant to sign such a
deal but was desperately in need of the funds. Unexpectedly, China’s Exim Bank came
forward with an offer to provide $2 billion worth of loans, with no conditionalities
regarding corruption or transparency attached.26 Angola turned down the IMF’s
assistance and agreed to provide China with 40,000 barrels of oil per day.27
The Angolan government released a statement saying that Western financial
markets impose “conditions on developing countries that are nearly always unbearable
and sometimes even politically unacceptable.” The Chinese loan however, imposed no
“humiliating conditions” on Angola.28 Western media and aid organizations denounced
China for helping Angola to avoid pressure to clean up corruption.29 The country
director for CARE commented, “This big Chinese loan. . . gives a lot more flexibility for
Angola not to comply with the conditions for other deals. . . It allows the government
to escape . . . transparency.”30
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The other side to this story is obvious. The Chinese loans are currently being used
to restore three rail lines that are essential to Angola’s mineral exports, construct a
new airport, and build low-income housing.31 As Deborah Brautigam points out, “there
is still enormous corruption, but roads, clinics, and schools are being built.”32 Angola
has experienced double-digit growth in the second half of this decade.33 How well
the growth translates into reduction in inequality, however, has yet to be seen. The
Angolans have also begun to publish an account of their oil revenues and expenditures
on the website of their Ministry of Finance, taking steps toward transparency even
without IMF loan pressures.34
Sudan

“Business is

In the late 1990s, after American and Canadian
business. We try to
companies abandoned South Sudanese oil fields in
response to North American consumer and investor separate politics
hostility, China stepped in and filled the void.35 The from business.
state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) owns the largest share in Sudan’s largest . . . I think the
oil venture, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating internal situation
Company.36 Not only did Khartoum use Chinese
in the Sudan is an
oil money to fund its ethnic cleansing of southern
insurgents, but China sold them the weapons to do internal affair.”
it.37 In violation of a UN embargo, $100 million worth
of aircraft and small arms were sold to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir between
1996 and 2003.38 The Chinese ambassador to South Africa, Liu Guijin, explained,
“We don’t believe in embargoes. That just means that people suffer. From a practical
consideration, embargoes and sanctions can’t solve problems.”39 Chinese Deputy
Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong was quoted as saying, “Business is business. We try
to separate politics from business. . . . I think the internal situation in the Sudan is an
internal affair.”40
Eventually, however, China did an about-face on its policy of non-intervention
in Sudan. In 2007, Beijing used its influence with Bashir to press for the acceptance of
a common African Union and United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur.41
Zambia
In the 1990s, China’s rapidly growing economy generated a demand for more and
more raw materials. The Chambishi copper mine, in the heart of Zambia’s copper
belt, had been closed for more than a decade when the China Non-Ferrous Metals
Corporation (CNMC) bought 85 percent of the mine in 1998 for $20 million.42 The
project was hailed as a prime example of how foreign investment can bring jobs and
spread technology to Africa. Then, in April 2005, an explosion at the mine killed fiftyone Zambian workers due to poor safety standards followed by Chinese foremen. A
year later, after the Chinese had banned union activity and began paying Zambian
employees less than the $67-a-month minimum wage, six Zambian workers were shot
VOLUME XXVII - 2012
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at a labor demonstration by a Chinese supervisor.43 A similar incident occurred in April
2011, when eleven protestors at a demonstration against poor working conditions were
shot and wounded by Chinese managers.44
In 2010, China’s investment in Zambia surpassed $1 billion, and an additional
$5 billion was recently promised for the next three years.45 It is estimated that at least
20,000 Zambian jobs have been created in the copper mines and support industries.46
Despite this growth, 60 percent of Zambia’s population still lives below the poverty
line.47 The World Bank reports that this is a case where “economic growth has not
translated into significant poverty reduction.”48 Most of China’s investment goes
directly back into the mining industry, with only “10 percent invested in agriculture,
retail, and manufacturing.”49
Anti-Chinese sentiment has become an increasingly important issue in domestic
Zambian politics. In the 2006 presidential election, the opposition candidate, Michael
Sata, ran on the platform that the Chinese exploitation of Zambia’s resources and
mistreatment of workers needed to be countered: “They are just flooding the country
with human beings instead of investment and the government is jumping. We have to
be careful because if we leave them unchecked, we will regret it. China is sucking from
us. We are becoming poorer because they are getting our wealth.”50 Chinese officials
announced that they would withhold further
investments until after the election. The incumbent
Sata’s victory
pro-China candidate, Rupiah Banda, won by
has been hailed
a small margin. Immediately after his victory,
China announced it would forgive $211 million of
as an anti-China
Zambia’s outstanding debt.51

referendum in

Africa. Since the
election, Zambian
employees have
received raises from
Chinese-owned
mining companies.

This past September, Banda and Sata faced
off again and this time Sata was the victor. On
the run-up to the polls, there were numerous
reports that the Chinese were funding Banda’s
campaign—a common rumor was that the Bandabranded lollipops handed out on the streets came
straight from China.52 Sata’s victory has been hailed
as an anti-China referendum in Africa. Since the
election, Zambian employees have received raises
from Chinese-owned mining companies.53

The Western Aid Approach: Conditionality
The above examples are the most controversial tales of Chinese involvement in Africa,
but China has given aid to every country in Africa but one—Swaziland (which still
recognizes Taiwan as the government of the mainland).54 Not all of them create news
stories, but most follow a similar approach. Almost all Chinese activity in Africa is related
to the creation of infrastructure, jobs, and a consumer market for Chinese goods. The
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West’s approach to development is far more complicated. National and international
donor agencies and NGOs “operate in the mix of theory and practice and the mix
changes regularly.”55 Over the decades governments, following academic debates, have
swung aid emphasis from infrastructure and manufacturing to rural development
programs, to structural adjustment, to the promotion of good governance, to the use of
bottom-up mechanisms, and to microfinance programs. Each time a theory is pursued
with enthusiasm, and each time the failings of the approach are quickly exposed.
This latest round of donor emphasis on liberalization, privatization, structural
adjustment, and good governance has not proven to be any more successful than
previous regimes. Evidence suggests that conventional aid fails to promote both
democracy and economic growth.56 One of the most popular critiques on the current
aid strategy is that it comes with too many burdensome strings attached. Requirements
for aid are essentially a form of central planning that swell state bureaucracies and
promote inefficiency. The funds are allocated from afar by ill-informed donors that
distort market forces and ignore local preferences.57

Failings of conditionality
China’s involvement in Africa with “rogue states” and corrupt governments has
received endless criticism from Western development minds. They argue that China
should use its economic leverage as a political tool, and threaten to cut off financial
ties to recipients that repeatedly violate human rights. They claim that aid rewards the
behavior of dictators and actively funds the oppression of reformists.58 This argument
makes a lot of sense, although it ignores the empirical data that shows the political
conditionality practiced by the West in Africa over the past decades has failed to actually
affect change. Morrisey provides a survey of the literature evaluating the effectiveness
of conditionality to force change on trade policy reform. He concludes that,
if countries displayed no initial tendency to implement reforms of the desired
type, then conditional lending appeared to have little effect in encouraging
reform. The only countries that appeared to meet conditions were those
whose governments favoured the economic policies embodied in the
adjustment programme; it was government preferences, not aid conditions,
that determined reform efforts. If interpreted strictly, specified reforms to be
‘substantially’ implemented within a short time period, conditionality fails.59

In addition to the critique that aid conditionality simply does not work, there are
further criticisms that it is unethical, or that it causes more harm than it fixes.60 Most of
these criticisms hinge on the fact that those who are in the most need of development
assistance often live under autocratic oppression, through no fault of their own. Cutting
off aid to dictatorial regimes means that the poorest are made to suffer for the sins of
their rulers.61
A second ethical argument concerning conditionality, and one that is particularly
popular with the Chinese, is that it is a form of interventionism that violates the
sovereignty of the targeted nation.62 Of course, the trade-off between human rights
VOLUME XXVII - 2012
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and sovereignty is an oft-discussed duality of international law and policy. The West
proclaims the existence of universal norms and principles that most of the world had
no involvement in codifying. The questionable legitimacy of these norms constitutes a
major rift between the developed and developing world.”63 Indeed, one famous observer
of development programs writes, “. . . political conditionality is mainly an attempt, in
a haphazard and largely bilateral manner, to impose Western values on Third World
countries, further eroding their sovereignty and weakening their position.”64

Poverty and Rights in Tension
Conditionality is often said to cause more harm than good because it impedes the natural
growth process of governance. African governments are deprived of the responsibility
of determining their own future.65 Political competence and accountability grows by
learning-by-doing, and Western intervention circumvents this mechanism.
There is a growing body of literature that argues the Western development
machine is demanding too much too soon from governments on their progress toward
human rights, transparency, and democracy. These demands are getting in the way
of economic growth, which may itself be a precondition for good governance. Khan
exposes this chicken-and-egg dilemma in his look at corruption and development.
He points out that in the East Asian “tiger economies”—development successes by
many metrics—growth was pursued with little regard for much else.66 Khan continues,
“Levels of corruption were often very high during the early period of rapid economic
growth and poverty reduction, property rights were not stable in critical respects, the
rule of law was far from satisfactory, and accountability was often far removed from
the democratic ideal.”67
Corruption is not a good thing, but the evidence shows that rapid growth can
happen in spite of it. Indeed, cronyism and graft have been present in every country’s
early stages of capitalist government, from the United States during the industrial
revolution, to China today.68 The empowerment of civil society, elimination of
corruption, and labor reform was a long (and ongoing) process in the developed world.
More importantly, it was a grass-roots process. There was no World Bank demanding
transparency from Tammany Hall. Does this mean that the West just needs to leave
Africa well enough alone? Its democracy promotion initiatives have made even less
progress than its poverty reduction ones. Thomas Carothers warns of the moral
ambiguity of adopting a “sequentialist” view of democracy evolution. “Whatever might
be theoretically preferable regarding paths of development, people in many parts of the
world want to attain political empowerment now, not at some indefinite point in the
future.”69 It is inconsistent with Western ideals to let a generation endure a lifetime of
autocracy for the promise of possible future representation for their children.70
Of course, this view is totally consistent with China’s own perception of itself. Like
other East Asian nations, China has had substantial economic growth without making
major progress toward the rule of law or respect for human rights.71 The Chinese have
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made it clear again and again that civil and political rights are a secondary priority
compared with economic, social, and cultural rights. The Communist Party has done a
remarkable job of increasing the average income of its people and maintaining stability
in a region that has tens of thousands of protests a year.72 Debates rage over whether or
not China will successfully democratize in the coming decades, or whether it will break
the mold of assumptions about the relationship between sustained levels of per capita
income and democracy.73
Regardless, to China, the question of whether or not we should “let” a generation
of Angolans endure autocracy for development’s sake is an absurd and paternal
one. Angola’s government is Angola’s problem. China is not squeamish about
associating with the authoritarian governments of Angola and Zimbabwe because
its own experience with development has been, ‘grow first, rights later.’ China is the
prime example of an “authoritarian developmental state,” wherein the government
retains the authority to actively intervene in the
As much as the
state to promote its transition from an agrarian to
West proclaims that
industrialized capitalist economy.74

African Embrace
As much as the West proclaims that China’s
approach is bad for Africa, there are many nations—
authoritarian and democratic—stepping up to
take China’s money. The democratically-elected
president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, published
an op-ed in Financial Times that is now figured
prominently on the website of the Chinese Embassy
in South Africa.75 In it, he praises China’s pragmatic
approach to investment in his country,

China’s approach is
bad for Africa, there
are many nations—
authoritarian
and democratic—
stepping up to take
China’s money.

. . . the Chinese model for stimulating rapid economic development has much
to teach Africa. With direct aid, credit lines and reasonable contracts, China has
helped African nations build infrastructure projects in record time—bridges,
roads, schools, hospitals, dams, legislative buildings, stadiums and airports.
In many African nations, including Senegal, improvements in infrastructure
have played important roles in stimulating economic growth. . . . It is a telling
sign of the post-colonial mindset that some donor organisations in the west
dismiss the trade agreements between Chinese banks and African states that
produce these vital improvements—as though Africa was naïve enough to just
offload its precious natural resources at bargain prices to obtain a commitment
for another stadium or state house. . . . I have found that a contract that would
take five years to discuss, negotiate and sign with the World Bank, takes three
months when we have dealt with Chinese authorities. I am a firm believer in
good governance and the rule of law. But when bureaucracy and senseless red
tape impede our ability to act—and when poverty persists while international
functionaries drag their feet—African leaders have an obligation to opt for
swifter solutions.
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Wade’s piece touches on an important facet of Sino-African relations, that the
Chinese do not have a colonial hangover. This means that their rhetoric, unlike the
West’s, is devoid of the language of duty, obligation, and guilt. What the Chinese do in
Africa is for “mutual economic benefit,” which is a refreshingly non-condescending
approach to development. For all the criticisms about their lack of transparency, the
Chinese goals are plain to see: let’s both get rich. For those that believe that foreign aid
has crippled Africa and burdened it with bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption,
China’s bare-bones market approach is seen as “a way out of the mess that the West has
made.”76

For all the criticisms
about their lack of
transparency, the

Chinese goals are plain
to see: let’s both get
rich. For those that
believe that foreign
aid has crippled
Africa and burdened
it with bureaucratic
inefficiencies and
corruption, China’s
bare-bones market
approach is seen as “a
way out of the mess that

China is itself a developing country,
which in the not-too-distant past had 85
percent of its population living below the
poverty line.77 Many African leaders feel they
have a lot to learn from China’s successes.
There is palpable South-South solidarity in
many of the speeches and roundtables about
China’s African presence. At the World
Social Forum in Nairobi, after a Tanzanian
criticized the Chinese for driving out
small businesses, a Chinese representative
responded: “We Chinese had to make the
same hard decision on whether to accept
foreign investment many, many years ago.
You have to make the right decision or you
will lose, lose, lose. You have to decide right
or you will remain poor.”78

African Backlash

Plenty of Africans are not pleased with
China’s increasing presence. The successful
the West has made.”
election of Michael Sata, who threatened to
throw all Chinese investors out of Zambia, is the most powerful example of discontent.
Many Africans claim that Chinese firms merely import all their labor rather than hire
locals, though this claim seems largely unsupported by the actual employment data.79
It is true that 1 million Chinese have moved to Africa in the past decade, many of
them to set up shop as entrepreneurs selling cheap imports.80 Much of the anti-China
sentiment boils down to protectionism. In September 2004, the powerful Congress of
South African Trade Unions threatened to boycott anyone selling Chinese products,
claiming that rising unemployment was a direct result of those imports.81
For as many African leaders you can find to praise the fact that Chinese investment
projects do not require tedious environmental impact assessments, you can find
hundreds of locals discontent over spilled crude oil or encroachment into national
VOLUME XXVII - 2012
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parks.82 There is a growing fear of China’s land grab ambitions as well. In 2006, China
offered a $2 billion loan to Mozambique for the construction of a dam on the Zambezi
River, which would create an irrigation infrastructure for huge amounts of fertile land
in the valley.83 A memorandum of understanding was then exchanged between the
two governments, allowing 3,000 Chinese settlers to begin farming in the area. Local
civil society was outraged, protests were launched, and eventually the plan had to be
scrapped out of fear of a public relations disaster.84

African Empowerment
Much of the above goes to show that Africans are not powerless on their own. Labor
unions in South Africa and Zambia have successfully raised wages for mine workers
to levels significantly higher than those paid in China itself.85 Local protests in
Mozambique forced China to rethink land settlement plans. The people of Zambia
elected a new president who pledged to raise taxes on Chinese corporations and
aggressively implement stronger accountability measures. African governments are
learning that China’s rapid growth means it needs them as much as they need China.
The Angolans recently walked away from an oil deal; months later the Chinese came
back with a better offer.86
China’s own development model turns around securing technology transfer from
developed countries. In past decades if a company wanted to set up shop in China to
take advantage of its cheap labor and low regulatory standards, it often had to share
intellectual property information. Many African governments are learning from this
very strategy in order to secure long-term benefits from China’s resource extraction.
Nigeria, for example, is developing a national policy that would require a certain high
percentage of local labor to be employed in foreign financed projects.87 Senegal requires
the transfer of technology and trainings in its investment deals.88
So perhaps China’s model is a reasonable answer to the failures of conditionality—
or at least a partial one. Much of Africa is firmly in a transformative developmental
state right now—growth is on the rise, turmoil and human rights abuses abound.
Like the United States during the turn of the 20th century, pockets of civil society are
rallying to meet these challenges. Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has
said that conditionality undermines the incentives for a society to reason and develop
analytic capacities. Its use “reinforces traditional hierarchical relationships” between
the donor and the recipient, and it ignores or circumvents the grass roots dialogue that
is necessary for societal change to have any lasting effect.89
China approaches Africa, not as a donor, but as a business partner. Its lack of
colonial baggage and status as a developing nation means that there is no unspoken
hierarchy influencing its relationship with African leaders. With its no-strings-attached
approach, China has allowed governments to spend the money as they see fit.
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Unconditioned Wealth
It is likely that China’s unconditioned approach may have positive effects for those
countries where it is establishing manufacturing and large scale agricultural projects—
Ethiopia, Zambia, South Africa, Tanzania, etc. There are opportunities for technology
transfer, employee training, and a diversification of the economy. For the countries
whose economy is dominated by sales of natural resources, however, the story might
be very different. Economists have observed the ill effects of “Dutch disease” for
decades: when a country receives most of its revenues from natural resources, its
currency appreciates, making its exports more expensive and its manufacturing sector
less competitive. This influx of funds can distort the governance of the country as
well. If a powerful central government does not need to rely on taxes for its budget, its
accountability is decreased, and it has no incentive to create strong bureaucracies.90
Keenan observes that this effect can occur with all kinds of influxes of wealth, foreign
aid included.91 In fact, countering this distortional effect is one of the justifications
for including conditional requirements with the aid package, loan, or commodity
contract in the first place. A survey of the literature on the resource curse shows the
unsurprising result that “states with strong institutions tend to handle resource wealth
more effectively than states with weak institutions.”92 Of course, China hasn’t made
much of an effort to selectively invest in states with strong institutions.

Influence of China on the Western Development Approach
The West has been watching China’s African activity with displeasure. Former President
of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, claimed that international financial institutions are
“losing projects in Asia and Africa to Chinese banks because [the Chinese] don’t bother
about social or human rights conditions.”93 The president of the European Investment
Bank angrily accused the Chinese of “unscrupulous” behavior.94 The head of the USChina Economic and Security Review Commission testified before Congress that China
is offering “a wealth of assistance in building African infrastructure without concern
about whether the benefits are accruing to the African people or only corrupt leaders.”95
The divergence of priorities in Africa between China and the West was beautifully
displayed in a single day’s worth of news.96 On April 28, 2006, the Dutch government
announced that it was suspending nearly $150 million in aid to Kenya because of its
failure to counter corruption.97 At the same time in Nairobi, China was signing a major
oil exploration agreement in exchange for road building, the construction of a sports
center, and infrastructure support for rice growers.98
China is only going to grow more and more involved with Africa. While they
might not like it, there is an opportunity for Western aid donors to learn from China’s
approach. Already, the European Union is reevaluating its use of conditionality, partly
because of the “realization that change cannot be imposed from the outside.”99 The
new Africa-EU Strategic Partnership has begun to “backtrack from conditionality” and
emphasizes financial rewards for meeting good governance standards, rather than
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punishment for failures to meet them.100 The Coordinator for Africa-China Relations
at the European Commission, Uwe Wissenbach, has written that, “China’s focus on
a mutual interest-based, commercially driven and politically high-level partnership
with Africa has concentrated minds in Europe . . .
on how the old donor-recipient partnership could The West’s approach
be transformed into a modern . . . partnership.”101

to development is

The West’s approach to development is about
about to become
to become far less charity-based, out of necessity as
much as out of good will. Competition from China far less charityhas forced the West to pay more attention to African
based, out of
governments than it has in a long time. The US and
the EU also depend on oil and mineral exports from necessity as much
Africa. With several wealthy great powers vying for as out of good will.
trade relationships, African leaders have become
very adept at playing competitors off one another. Competition from
As noted by an Angolan minister: “Our relations China has forced the
with China not only allowed us to obtain large
West to pay more
loans, but most importantly it forced the West to
treat us with more respect and in a less patronizing attention to African
way. For that we are grateful.”102 The West has
governments than it
some catching up to do. China now has established
embassies in more African countries than do the has in a long time.
United States or any European country.103 China
has made much of this diplomacy effort, noting that it pays attention to all African
countries, not just those with strategically important resources.104
There is the possibility that a war over investment opportunities between the
OECD and China could have negative implications for Africa. If the EU allows China’s
approach to change its own environmental and labor standards in Africa, a race to
the bottom could lead to a resource grab with little sustainable benefit.105 While there
is little evidence that this will occur anytime soon, it is clear that China’s presence
in Africa is having an impact on the debate over development policies. The German
Development Institute notes that in “some EU Member States the private sector has
already raised concern about competitive disadvantages and trade diversion of exports
to Africa in the light of Chinese engagement. Pressure has been put on European
governments to re-tie their development assistance.”106 Tied aid is foreign assistance
that must be spent in the donor country. China has always done this, but the practice
is discouraged in the West and even illegal in the United Kingdom. It is estimated that
tied aid increases the costs of development by up to 30 percent.107

Moving Forward
How should the EU and the US engage China on issues of African development? Can
there be cooperation when democracy promotion, human rights protection, and antiVOLUME XXVII - 2012
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corruption are three of the key mandates of the West’s program and when China simply
declares that it “respects African countries’ choice in political system”?108 The promotion
of good governance, civil society, and macroeconomic structure reform is absent from
China’s development rhetoric. The above discussion, about the failings of conditionality
and the moral dilemma of choosing between policies that promote rights versus poverty
reduction, shows that maybe China’s reluctance to meddle in this realm is not a terrible
thing. Unless the West can prove that its approach is making more progress, it does not
have much of a platform from which to criticize China. The activity that is unambiguously
bad for Africa—nonintervention in genocide, or the supplying of arms to brutal
dictators—should be denounced and pressure exerted on China to change those
policies. Fortunately, it seems like pressure has already started to work in this realm.
China has changed its tune with respect to Zimbabwe and Sudan, and committed
peacekeeping forces to the UN mission in Darfur.
China’s self-interested approach in its development mechanisms almost
guarantees that it would have no interest in harmonizing with the other donors
in Africa. Dahle-Huse argues, “China’s efforts could fill niches that the EU has left
open,” (although at the pace of growth, it is more likely that the EU could fill in China’s
niches).109 China actively engages with the infrastructure sector, while the OECD has
generally backed away from this area. This uncoordinated co-existence could be made
more palatable to the EU if there were “internationally recognised legal standards
for responsible lending.”110 It is unclear why China would agree to such standards.
Western governments and companies have voluntary agreed to certain rules that guide
their actions in developing countries: the Equator Principles, the Extractive Industries
Transparency Guidelines, the Kimberly Process, etc. China has demonstrated very
little interest in subscribing to these rules and agreements. It has had no role in coauthoring these standards, sees them as a Western
It seems clear that attempt to stifle China’s economic growth, and has a
domestic civil society that is too preoccupied with its
the solution is
own problems to exert any pressure on standards for
going to have to be foreign investment.111

an African one.

It seems clear that the solution is going to have
to be an African one. Individual nations are already
creating “rules of engagement” for their dealings with foreign investors.112 Members
of civil society from all over the continent are coming together to discuss corporate
social sustainability requirements for Chinese investment.113 At a recent conference,
Kenyan journalist and activist Firoze Manji pointed out that the same activities called
greedy Chinese resource grabs are “described as bringing about job creation, poverty
alleviation, and development assistance” when they are undertaken by the West. Manji
called for the creation and application of the same standards for all investors.114
One of the most important questions about the future of this conditionality/nonconditionality divide is how other non-Western investors will choose to model their own
approach to African development. China’s activity is only the leading edge of a much
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wider search for energy security and natural resources on the part of many emerging
economies across Asia and the world. The journalist John Ghazvinian in his book
Untapped: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil captures this reality in the title of his final
chapter: “The Chinese are Coming!... But Who Isn’t?”115 He reports that the Malaysian
state oil company Petronas is already involved in fourteen African countries, including
a project with the Chinese in Sudan. South Korea is now the world’s fourth-largest oil
importer, and growing.116 The Koreans are attempting to mimic China’s approach by
investing billions of dollars in investment projects in exchange for extraction rights.117
This “petro-diplomacy” strategy mastered by China has not been adopted
whole-heartedly by all developing economies. India’s petroleum secretary aired his
grievances regarding the relationship between development aid and oil exploration
offering, “Both Nigeria and Angola have conveyed that preference will be given to those
offering economic packages. How much share you get in a block, they say, depends on
the economic-development package you give.”118 Despite these objections, India later
announced that it would be making its own multi-billion dollar oil-for-infrastructure
deals in African countries. Brazil and South Africa have made similar forays into the
market.119
The above goes to show that there is opportunity for the West to choose to act as a
leader in investment and engagement practices in the coming decades. By unfettering
itself from traditional conditionality arrangements, the West could refashion itself as
a partner with African nations. This action could provide a much-needed alternative
model to the Chinese one, incorporating concepts of Corporate Social Responsibility,
voluntary standards, and investment guidelines. These principles could be adopted
throughout the continent by investors from developing nations, especially from the
many growing democracies, who decide to consider the human rights and governance
implications of their investment activity.

Conclusion
In the past, international organizations like the World Bank have been criticized for
making loans to needy African countries conditional upon political reforms externally
defined by Western standards. Now the situation is flipped on its head, with China
granting large, unconditional, and very cheap loans without concern for transparency
or accountability. These loans are certainly problematic, especially when they are given
to autocratic governments lording over oil and mines. However, the West needs some
humility in admitting that it has not been getting development in Africa right either.
China offers an alternative rapid growth-at-any-cost model that many African leaders
are embracing. The African response to potential Chinese exploitation has been
growing—and it mirrors that of the historical phases of other transitional capitalist
economies—protests over labor standards, and elections of reformist politicians.
Rather than stage an aggressive bilateral face off with China over investment standards,
the West ought to encourage the African agenda and capacity for setting the rules of
engagement.
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